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The quest for efficiency underlies the reform  the more productive firms and workers and of
efforts of the socialist economies, but job security  the household sector as a whole.
and overemployment (redundant jobs) still
characterize these economies.  Vodopivec argues  Vodopivec substantiates his argument with
that reforming socialist economies have main-  an empirical analysis of the redistribution
tained job security not through planning but  associated with the soft budget constraint in
mainly through a complicated bargaining among  Yugoslavia in the 1970s and 1980s.  He shows
coalitions (special-interest groups) that results in  that redistribution to be the outcome of a con-
a massive redistribution.  This redistribution  frontation among coalitions and explains its
amounts to a bailing out of the ailing or less  compensatory nature.
productive firms and workers at the expense of
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References  24In Marxist  ideology,  the  primary  avowed  goal  of socialist  countries  has
been to abolish  capitalism's  exploitation  of  workers. According  to  Marx,
workers  under  capitalism  are  treated  as "commodities"  and are  exploited  by
selling  their  labor  at a  price  below  the  value  of  what that labor  produces.
Marx claimed  that  workers  are  forced  into  such  transactions  because  their
labor  is their  only  source  of income  and  the  so-called  industrial  reserve  army
prevents  wages  from  rising  above  a subsistence  level. To uproot  exploitation,
then,  the  abolishing  of the  labor  market  seems  to  be no less  necessary  than
turning  ownership  of the  means  of production  to the  public.
In traditional  centrally  planned  economies  (CPEs),  central  planning  and
state  ownership  are  the  primary  means  for  achieving  Marxist  goals.' This
paper  recognizes  that  the  reforming  socialist  economies  (RSEs)--Yugoslavia,
Hungary,  and  Poland--carry  over  the  job  security  and  overemployment  typical  in
the  traditional  CPEs,  but  argues  that  the  mechanism  generating  that  phenomenon
is fundamentally  different  from  that functioning  in CPEs. 2 Rather  than  being
achieved  by planning,  job  security  and  overemployment  are  produced  primarily
by a complicated  bargaining  process  that  could  be regarded  as  bargaining  over
employment  subsidies. The  outcome  of such  bargaining  is a  massive
compensatory  redistribution  of income,  a redistribution  that  amounts  to
bailing  out (preventing  bankruptcy)  or increasing  the  earnings  of ailing  or
1/  Granick (1987)  argues  that overemployment  and job security  in CPEs is
consistent  with the  hypothesis  that  planners  prefer  employment  over all
other  economic  goals  (that  is,  that  planners  have  lexicographic  job-rights
preferences).
2/  By  RSEs I  mean countries  that initially  adopted  the  model  of a centrally
planned  economy  developed  in  the  USSR  between  the  two  world  wars  and  later
abolished  central  planning  as  a  key  coordinating  mechanism  while  retaining
state  or social  ownership  of the  means of production  (best  examples  are
Yugoslavia  since  the  mid-1960s  and  Hungary  since  1968).2
less  productive  firms  and  workers--all  at the  expense  of those  that are  more
productive  and  of the  household  sector  as a  whole.  In other  words,  the
notorious  softness  of the  budget  constraint  of firms  (the  fact  that firms  do
not  have  to look  at the  bottom  line)  explains  job  security  and  overemployment
4n RSEs. 3 And the  softness  of that  budget  constraint  is itself  endogenous  in
economies  where  the  conflicting  interests  of  various  groups  are  not
intermediated  through  the  market  and  where  checks  and  balances  do  not
countervail  the  power  of political  elites.
To substantiate  this  argument,  I rely  on empirical  analysis  of income
redistribution  as practiced  in  Yugoslavia  in the  1970s  and  1.9808.'  I start  by
comparing  goals,  means,  and  outcomes  of CPE  and  RSE labor  markets  (section  1).
I then  describe  the  channels  through  which  the  redistribution  is  carried  out,
the  quantification  of the  redistribution  flows  associated  with those  channels,
and  the  econometric  investigation  of the  pattern  of redistribution  (section
2).  I further  probe  the  mechanism  of redistribution  by  viewing  it  as a
confrontation  between  distributional  (special-interest)  coalitions  in section
3.  That sets  the  stage  for  conclusions  and  policy  implications  (section  4).
1.  THE  REFORMS AND EMPLOYMENT  GOALS OF  SOCIALIST  ECONOMIES
After  World  War  II,  the  countries  of Eastern  Europe  adopted,  with a few
modifications,  the  economic  system  the  USSR  developed  between  the  two  wars.
The  central  authorities--the  state  planning  commission  and  branch  ministries-
3/  See for  example,  Kornai  (1980)  on the  soft  budget  constraint.
4/  Even  in  Yugoslavia,  the  only  socialist  country  with open  unemployment  (15
percent  by  the  end  of  the  1980s),  overemployment  is  very significant.  For
example,  Mencinger  (1989)  estimates  that  about  20 percent  of employment
in  Yugoslavia  is redundant.3
-form._lated  detailed  production  plans  and  exercised  control  over  their
implementation.  Through  a detailed  balarcing  of labor  as a  key  ingredient  of
planning  (Schroeder  1982),  government  tried  to  match  the  demand  for  workers
embodied  in  production  plans  with the  existing  supply  of labor  (by  skill  and
region). To cope  with labor  shortages,  the  government  also  manipulated  basic
wage rates  to steer  labor  in desired  directions.
The system  as it  worked  in those  countries  initially  produced  relatively
rapid  economic  growth,  together  with  a seeming  macroeconomic  ratior.a.ity--
that  is,  it prevented  open  unemployment  and  inflation. But  as early  as 1948
the  most eager  reformer  (Yugoslavia)  recognized  that  the  traditional  CPE  model
had  serious  flaws. The  thrust  of reforms  in socialist  economies  has  been  to
replace  the  existing  system  of central  planning  with a  more efficient
coordinating  mechanism. First,  mandatory  short-term  central  plans
(representing  the  planners'  tightest  hold on  the  economy)  were abolished  and
replaced  by  more subtle  instruments  if  indirect  control. Second,  paralleling
the  reduced  scope  of planning  was an increased  reliance  on the  market  (and
hence  prices)  as a  means  of coordinating  economic  activity. Third,
enterprises  were given  autonomy  in  many areas,  ranging  from  price-setting  to
decisions  about  product  mix and  investment  and  even  to the  selection  of
managers--an  autonomy  that  government  has,  however,  continually  breached.
Fourth,  to improve  motivation,  proilit  incentives  replaced  the  multiple
criteria  of central  planning.
The  general  emphasis  on the  market  as  a coordinating  device  implicitly
acknowledged  that  the  objective  of full  employment  is hardly  consistent  with
the  objective  of rational  employment  (Fallenbuchl  1982). To some  extent,  this
was also  reflected  in officially  proclaimed  goals. For  example,  Gierek's4
strategy  of economic  growth  explicitly  identified  rational  employment  policy
as a goal (Adam  1984,  143). Moreover,  all  of the  reforming  countries
(Yugoslavia,  Hungary,  Poland)  have  been  encouraging  a rational  use of labor  by
introducing  various  incentive  schemes  in firms. Only  Yugoslavia,  however,
among  the  RSEs,  was  w'lling  to accept  open  unemployment  as a necessary  by-
product  of its  reforms.
Despite  the  quest  for  efficiency  that  underlies  the  reform  efforts  and
goals  of socialist  economies,  employment  has  remained  remarkably  unchanged.
The  labor  market  in  RSEs is still  characterizad  by overemployment  (redundant
workers). This  paper  argues,  to repeat,  that  the  means for  achieving
overemployment  in  RSEs differs  fundamentally  from  the  means for  achieving  it
in  CPEs.  In CPEs,  overemployment  is  planned. In RSEs,  it is a result  of the
redistribution  of income  aimed  at  bailing  out the  ailing  parts  of the  economy.
2-.  THE  MECHANISM  OF REDISTRIBUTION
To  characterize  the  Yugoslav  economy,  one  must  widen the  framework  for
discussing  redistribution  of  income.  Formal  taxes  and  subsidies  are  only  the
tip  of the iceberg  of income  redistribution.  Significant  redistribution  takes
a less  visible  form. The  appropriation  of financial  savings  based  on an
inflation  tax is  also  a form  of redistribution;  compulsory  financial
investments  with large  stipulated  negative  returns  is another.
2.1  Channels  of redistribution
I introduce  several  subcategories  of taxes  and  subsidies. Taxes  include
formal  taxes,  quasitaxes,  and "losses  on  money";  subsidies  include  formal
subsidies,  quasisubsidies,  and "gains  on  money." These  categories  are
described  below (see  Appendix  for  their  precise  definition).5
Formal  taxes  and formal  subsidies
Formal  taxes  and formal  subsidies  are  pure income  transfers. Formal
taxes  are  republicen  income  taxes,  some  other  obligations  which  have  the
nature  of taxes (such  as expenses  for  preserving  the  environment  and  payments
for  so-called  social  self-defence),  and  payments  for  the  provision  of social
services  to the  so-called  Self-Managed  Communities  of Interest  (SMCIs).
Formal  subsidies  are  nonreimbursable  resources  obtained  to prevent  or lessen  a
loss  reported  in the  annual  income  statement,  or to help  once such  a lose  has
been incurred  (at  least  part of grants  can  be used  to finance  perstnal
incomes). Sources  of subsidies  are  other  firms  with the  Working  Organization
of Associated  Labor (WOAL)  and  government  (state)  reserve  and  solidarity  funds
(Law  of  Associated  Labor,  Article  155). Also,  some  forms  of interfirm
crediting  (called  "resource  pooling"  because  the  creditors  supposedly  retain
decisionmaking  power  over  the  resources  lent)  specify  that  the  creditor  must
help cover  the  debtor's  losses,  should  they  incur.'
Quasitaxes  and  quasisubsidies
Quasitaxes  are  complete  or  nearly  complete  appropriations  cf resources
by onfe  agent  that  are  formally  accounted  for  as financial  investments  by
another  agent. That  is,  the  resources  appear  on the  asset  side  of the
investor's  balance  sheet,  but are  typically  written  off  after  some  time
(several  years,  for  example).'  To a  much lesser  extent,  they  are  repaid  to
5/  The opposite  case,  participating  in the  debtor's  profits,  rarely  yields
positive  real  gains,  since  principal  is usually  not  revalued  and  payment
of the profit share (in  Yugoslavia's  highly inflationary  environment)
normally  does  not even  make  up for  the  loss  of the  principal.
6/  Enterprises  are  advised  by  government  to  accept  self-management  agreements
to that effect.  These agreements  are supposed  to serve as a veil
preserving  the  legality  and  integrity  of  the  system  despite  the  involuntary
and  discretionary  nature  of the  transfers.6
the  investor,  but  only  at their  face  value  or at a small  positive  nominal
interest  rate  with a grace  period  of several  years,  which  means--with
inflation--at  a substantially  negative  real  interest  rate (in  real  terms  only
a  minute  portion  of the  original  investment  is recovered). 7 Both sides
clearly  understand  the  grar.t  implicit  in this  kind of financial  investment,  so
these  investments  are  clearly  involuntary.  Quasisubsidies  are  the
counterparts  of quasitaxes.
The  channels  for  this  type  of transfer  are  as follows:
- Credits to cover the loss.
- Rehabilitation credits.
- Resource pooling.
- Investments  in  development  funds,  special  government  funds,  securities,
or SMCIs  of  material  production.'
- Investment  in  a  WOAL's  solidarity  and  reserve  funds.
- Foreign  loans  to enterprises  from  commercial  banks--to  the  extent  that
the  enterprises  are  relieved  from  exchange  rate  risk. 9
7/  For example,  the loan to the Federal  Fund for the Accelerat 4.on of the
Development  of Less Developed  Republics  and Provinces  is repaid  in 13
annuities,  after  a grace  period  of three  years  and  with an interest  rate
of 5 percentl  (The  Use of the  Account  Plan for an OAL, Information  on
Book-Keeping  and  Profession,  1985.)
8/  These  include  natural  monopolies  (electricity,  coal  mining,  oil,  and  gas),
infrastructure  (railroads,  roads,  ports,  airports),  and some utilities
(broadcasting,  telephone,  mail).  They finance  part of their  investment
through  direct  "contributions"  from  firms  in other  industries.
9/  Until  recently,  this  was  true  in  Yugoslavia.  Authorities  allowed  exchange
rate differences  stemming from this type of  loan  (the effects of
revaluation  of foreign  loans  denominated  in dinars  as a result  of the
depreciation  of  domestic  currency)  to  be deferred  and  thus  to  be shown  on
enterprises'  balance sheets  as an increase in assets (under "active
deferrals").  Thus,  they  would  not  appear  among  costs  when they  were  due,
so only  the  original  counterpart  of a loan  in  dinars  was translated  into
costs--creating  large  excess  demand  (see  World  Bank 1989).7
- Waivers  of taxes,  contributions,  and  compulsory  pooling  of resources.
- "Borrowing"  from  the  firm's  own  business  fund  to cover  the loss
(lossmakers  are,  to some  extent,  entitled  to do so).'°
Most of these  channels  (vehicles  of taxation)  ars  used only  selectively.
If a firm  is  unable  to  meet its  obligations  without  incurring  a loss,  the
obligations  are  reduced,  deferred,  or simply  waived. Lossmakers  (and  some
other  firms,  as determined  by law)  are  thus  exempted  from  partly  relieved  of,
or allowed  to defer  the  obligation  (a)  to  pay  taxes  for  republican  govarnment,
(b)  to contribute  to republican  reserve  and  solidarity  funds,  and  (c)  to pool
resources  in  the  Federal  Fund  for  Financing  Less  Developed  Regions  and  SMCIs
of  material  production.
A word about  the  enterprises'  "ability  to  pay."  The income-sharing
nature  of personal  incomes  in  Yugoslavia  makes  labor  costs,  at least
theoretically,  very flexible. If  external  obligations  (and  capital
accumulation)  were given  priority,  and  the  firm's  personal  income  fund  were
treated  as a residual,  most enterprises  would indeed  by able  to  meet their
obligations. Of course,  the  residual  left  for  personal  incomes  could  had  been
small--even  _ropping  below  the  level  needed  ;.o  provide  a  minimum  standard  of
living. To avoid  so socially  undesirable  a situation,  priority  is given  to
personal  incomes,  and  capital  accumulation  and  other  obligations  considered
residual. The  quasifixed  nature  of personal  earnings  determines  the  amount  of
residual  net  income  and  thus  the  firm's  "ability  to pay" its  obligations.
Gains  and  losses  on  money
Real  gains  (losses)  from  inflation  based  on holding  money  assets  (assets
10/  The firm  is  obliged  to repay  these  funds  in  the future,  but at least  the
"gain  on money"  clause  applies  (that  is,  with inflation  the  firm repays
to its  business  fund  less  in real  terms  than  it  borrows  from  it).8
whose  values  are  firmly  fixed  in the  money  unit,  such  as cash,  debts  owned  by
the  firm,  and loans  given  to other  firms),  are  called  "gains  (losses)  on
money"  (Baxter  1984,  58-78)."  Given  Yugoslavia's  historical  practice  of
holding  the interest  rate  significantly  below  the  iuflation  rate,  the  borrower
thus  accrues  significant  gains  on  money  and  the  lender  loses  on  money.' 2
(Also,  there  were several  debt  write-offs  for  the  worst  firms  in the 1970s  and
1980s.) Thus the  banking  system  has  been  a significant  source  of
redistribution  from  net  creditors  to  net deJtors.
In the  empirical  analysis  that  follows,  these  channels  of redistribution
are  quantified  from  the  accounting  data.  But ither  important  channels  of
redistribution--not  easily  quantifiable  if at all--are  omitted  from  the
analysis. The  most important  channels  not  accounted  for  are:
(a)  Impl5:it  taxation  through  regulated  prices.
(b)  Redistribution  through  accounting  methods: A firm's  financial  results
also  "depend"  on the  accountants'  ability  to bend  rules  and  come  up  with
a "positive  zero"  (a  barely  positive  result  on the  income  statement),  to
avoid  paying  taxes  and  quasitaxes. This  is particularly  important  in
Yugoslavia,  where  accounting  rules  do not  allow  for  inflation,' 3 and
11/  Yugoslavia  has traditionally  been  plagued  by 4nflation. Inflation  rose
from  about  30  percent  in 1980  to  full  hyperin  >Ation  by the  end  of 1989.
12/  The government  has repeatedly  confirmed  "active  interest  rate policy"
(advocating  positive  real  interest  rates)  but  that  was  more rhetoric  than
intention.  The  conflict of  interests on  interest rate policies--
reflecting  a personal  rather  than an objective,  impersonal  approach  to
decisionmaking--will  be discussed  later.
13/  The  treatment  of inventories  is especially  deficient. As one empirical
study  shows,  because  of  the  widespread  use  of tle  FIFO  accounting  method,
material  costs  have  been  understated  and  income  overstated,  thus  allowing
higher  wage increases  and adding  to pressures  on inflation  (Lavrac  and
Cibej  1986).9
where  no independent  auditing  companies  restrict  firms'  discretion  in
applying  rules.
(c)  1ating  up a firm's  own  capital  through  "greater  or lesser  depreciation
of all assets  in real  terms  through  improper  or inadequate  operation  of
the  enterprise"  (Vanek  1972).
2.2  Quantification  of redistribution
Before  presenting  empirical  evidence  on the  flows  of interfirm
redistribution,  let  ma describe  t.ae  methodology  used  to calculate  those  flows.
Formal  taxes  and  subsidies  are  calculated  as  the sum  of appropriate  flows
(taken  mostly  from  the  income  statement).  For  other  variables  (quasitaxes,
quasisubsidies,  and  losses  and  gains  on  money),  the  following  method  is  used.
The  redistribution  flow (RFLOW,  where  RFLOW  could  be each  of the above
variables)  is calculated as
B_ 1 +  Bo
RFLOW - INFLR  x
2
where  INFLR  is  an inflation  rate (equal  to 95.9  percent--retail  price  index---
for  Slovenia  in 1986)  and  B- 1 and  Bo  are  the  tax (subsidy)  bases  at the  end  of
the  previous  and  current  years,  respectively.  Note that  the  redistribution
flows  are  expressed  in terms  of the  money  units  at the  end  of the  period,  and
that  the  equilibrium  real  interest  rate  is assumed  to equal  zero. The tax
(subsidy)  base is the  sum  of the  items  described  for  various  categories  (see
Appendix).
In calculating  losses  on money,  the  amount  calculated  using  the  above
formula  is reduced  by the  sum of interest  payment  received  and  the  amount  of
joint  income  received  through  participation  in resource  pooling. Similarly,10
in calculating  gains  on  money,  the  amount  calculated  using  this  formula  is
reduced  by the sum  of interest  payments  paid  by the  enterprise  and  income  paid
to other  enterprises  as a dividend  from  resource  pooling."
Table  1 shows  the  redistribution  of income  for  a sample  of 416  Slovenian
enterprises  for  1986,  based  on their  annual  income  statements  and  balance
sheets. Formal  taxes  amount  to 16.4  percent  of income,  and  the  tax  rate
varies  little  (the  coefficient  of  variation  is  24.9  percent). By contrast,
the  informal  components  of taxation--quasitaxes  and  losses  on  money--are  both
larger  and  more  variable. Quasitaxes  are  nearly  50 percent  higher  than  proper
taxes,  and  vary greatly. The coefficient  of  variation  of losses  on  money is
somewhat  lower,  and  their  share  in income  (63.1  percent)  is the  highest.
14/  Although  generally  in  the  19809  the  discrepancy  between  the  inflation  rate
and  the  dinar  depreciation  rate  was  not  significant,  that  was  not  the  case
in 1986.  Then, even money liabilities  (assets)  dominated  in foreign
exchange  could  bring  gains  (losses)  on money.  This type  of gain (loss)
is atypical  (and  unpredictable),  however,  so it  has  been ignored.11
Table: Redistribution Flows
Coefficient of  Minimum  Maximum
Variable  Mean  variation  value  value
FTAXR  16.4  24.9  0.2  134.1
QTAXR  23.1  93.7  0.0  201.7
MLOSSR  63.1  66.8  1.2  611.8
FSUBSR  0.4  821.3  0.0  63.8
QSUBSR  7.4  200.7  0.6  377.3
MGAINR  60.5  89.3  -45.9  852.5
NSUBSR  -34.2  -108.5  -157.5  533.5
Notes:  All variables are in the form of rates (a  percentage of the firm's
income); their mean is the income-weighted mean.
FTAXR:  formal tax rate.
QTAXR:  quasitax rate.
MLOSSR:  rate of losses on money.
FSUBSR:  rate of formal subsidies.
QSUBSR:  rate of quasisubsidies.
MGAINR:  rate of gains on money.
NSUBSR:  rate of net subsidies, defined as the difference between
the sum of subsidy rates (SUBSR,  QSUBSR, and MGAINR) and
the sum of tax rates (FTAXR, QTAXR, and MLOSSR).
Formal subsidies for the sample amount to 0.4 percent of income.  Most
enterprises receive none of them (they are distributed only to the lossmakers)
and some receive heavy subsidies, so formal subsidies vary extremely--more
than any other redistribution flows.  Quasisubsidies are considerably higher
(7.4 percent) and also vary greatly.  The largest among subsidies are gains on
money (60.5 percent of income); they vary less than other subsidy flows, but
more than formal taxes and losses on money, and only a little less than
quasitaxes.
Looking now at overall redistribution (the sum of taxes minus the sum of
subsidies, as reflected in the variable NSUBSR), this sample of enterprises
turns out to be a net taxpayer.  Net taxes amount to 34.2 percent of income.
Many social services in Yugoslavia are financed directly from enterprise
income (in capitalist countries they are paid for largely from disposable12
income)  so the  fact  that  enterprises  are  net taxpayers  should  not  come  as a
surprise. But  many enterprises--75  of them,  or 18  percent--receive  a net
subsidy. Significant  intraindustry  differences  confirm  the  general  finding
that  redistribution  is  highly  selective  and  discretionary.
These  results  lend  themselves  to some  interesting  conclusions:
(a)  Quasitaxes  are  much higher  than  formal  taxes. And formal  taxes  are
fairly  uniform,  while  quasitaxes  are  selective.
(b)  Formal  subsidies  and  quasisubsidies  (largely,  pure gifts)  together
represent  a significant  7.8  percent  of income. Some  firms  receive  only
small  and  others  very large  subsidies.
(c)  Total  taxes  (formal  taxes,  quasitaxes,  and  losses  on  money)  for  the
enterprises  in the  sample  are  large,  exceeding  total  income  by 2.5
percent. Total  subsidies  are  significantly  lower,  but still  amount  to
68.3  percent  of income. Both  are  clear  evidence  of the  heavy  resource
transfers.
2.3  The  pattern  of redistribution
What are  the  driving  forces  behind  such  variable  income  redistribution?
As described  in  Vodopivec  (1989),  the  mechanism  of controlling  personal
earnings  assumes  that  the  personal  earnings  fund  participates  regressively  in
firm  income,  explicitly  aiming  to  reduce  personal  earnings  differentials  among
firms. But  such  a system  for  determining  personal  earnings  can  only  be
realized  through  income  redistribution.  To be able  to offer  higher  personal
earnings  and  meet other  contractual  obligations,  enterprises  with below-
average  income  per  worker  must  receive  subsidies  (in  various  forms). The
donors  of these  subsidies  are the  above-average  enterprises  and  households13
with  net  money  assets.
This  mechanism  is confirmed  by the  following  regression  equation  (OLS
method,  t-statistics  in  parentheses;  industry  dummies  are included,  but  not
reported)  :15
NSUBS/N - 5.157  - .511  *INC/N  R'  - .44  (1)
(1.40)  (-11.29)
where  NSUBS  are  net subsidies  (defined  as the sum  of formal  subsidies,
quasisubsidies,  and  gains  on  money)  minus the  sum  of formal  taxes,  quasitaxes,
and  losses  on money (as  defined  in section  1),  INC is the  firm's  realized
income  gross  of depreciation,  and  N the  number  of  workers  in the  firm."6
3.  THE  PUBLIC  CHOICE  EXPLANATION  OF REDISTRIBUTION
Literature  on the  soft  budget  constraint  acknowledges  the  bargaining
nature  of redistribution  under  the soft  budget  constraint,  but  has so far
failed  to identify  the  institutional  characteristics  of an economy  that  allows
such  a  massive  redistribution.  This is  particularly  surprising,  as such  an
analysis  should  be a guide  to the  reforms  currently  under  way in  many
countries  of Eastern  Europe--geared,  among  other  things,  to dramatically
reducing  such  redistribution.
I contend  that  RSEs simply  lack  adequate  institutions  to  prevent  such
redistribution.  To develop  my argument,  let  us analyze  income  redistribution
in terms  of the  confrontation  between  distributional  coalitions  (special-
15/  The  income-leveling  nature  of  redistribution  among  enterprises  in  socialist
economies  is  also  confirmed  by Rornai  and  Matits  (1987)  for  Hungary,  and
Schaffer  (1990)  for  Poland.
16/  The  results  are  based  on  416  observations  from  the  above-mentioned  sample
of Slovenian  enterprises.14
interest groups).  Every instance of redistribution involves a conflict
between two parties with diametrically opposing interests:  one advocating and
the other opposing the transfer (redistribution is a transfer of income--that
is, an uncompensated, one-way flow of resources).  Redistribution is so
pervasive and extensive because of the restrained institutional framework--in
particular, the structure of political (and, thus economic) power in socialist
economies.  The coalition pushing for redistribution can often--and, in
certain situations, always--gain enough support to overcome opposition and
make the transfer go through.
Let me illustrate.  Take, for example, concessionary financing
(quantitatively, probably the most important source of redistribution)--say, a
short-term bank loan to an enterprise at a negative real interest rate.' 7 The
usual "rationale" for requesting such a loan is simply to put out the fire--
that is, the enterprise's "need" for a financial injection because of its poor
performance.  Why would a bank undertake such an obviously unprofitable deal?
Surely the bank's depositors (more precisely, net depositors) oppose it.  The
bank manager and staff (to the extent that their personal income and the
manager's reputation depend on the bank's profitability) also have an
incentive to avoid such deals.  But a clearly defined group--the enterprise's
workers and managers--is pushing for such a loan.  For the firm's managers not
only personal income but a career and reputation are at stake.
No matter how good an enterprise's reasons for trying to get
17/  In 1986, the average interest rate Yugoslav banks charged on their loans
to enterprises  was about 32  percent (World  Bank 1988).  The inflation  rate
in 1985  was 85 percent, and the government had no serious commitment to
contain inflation, so the expected inflation rate in 1986 was no doubt
higher than the  average  interest  rate on  bank loans--which  means that  these
loans  were granted, on average, with ex-ante negative real interest rate.
(The actual Yugoslav inflation rate in 1986  was 91 percent.)15
concessionary  financing,  the  coalition  opposing  such  a deal  would,  in a  market
economy,  pay little  attention  to them  and  would  reject  this  kind  of a deal.
But in socialist  economies  the  enterprise  is  never  alone  in its  request.
Local  government  and  party  representatives  (and  for  larger  operations,  high
level  politicians)--motivated  predominantly  by personal  considerations--have  a
great  interest  in  preserving  employment,  even  at the  price  of continually
subsidizing  enterprise. So these  "godfathers"  form  a coalition  with the
enterprise  for  the  purpose  of getting  financial  help.  The  scale  of this  type
of redistribution  is evidence  of the  relative  power  of the  two  coalitions.
Or take  the  example  of formal  subsidies,  such  as the  transfer  of non
reimbursable  resources  between  sister  Basic  Organizations  of Associated  Labor
(BOALs)  to cover  losses  in one  of them. The coalition  opposing  the  transfer
is,  clearly,  workers  at the  donor  BOAL. They  usually  have little  if  anything
to do  with the  causes  of economic  problems  faced  by colleagues  in the
lossmaking  BOAL. Why shculd  they  transfer  their  income  to cover  the  lose?
The  coalition  pushing  for  this  transfer  is  not  hard to identify,  either. It
consists  of  workers  of the  lossmaking  BOAL,  commune  government,  and  party
representatives,  and  probably  the  WOAL  management. Whatever  the  reasons  for
the losses  (incompetent  management,  rigid  employment  legislation,  wrong
investment  decisions,  and so  on),  it is to the  advantage  of the  coalition  to
shift  income  from  one  BOAL  to another,  and  resort  to  both  persuading  and
putting  pressure  on the  workers  of the  donor  BOAL.
Similarly,  mandatory  "financial  investments"  (for  example,  in SMCIs  of
material  production  and  development  funds)  are  clearly  opposed  by investors
(managers  and  workers). But  political  structures  sometimes  find  these
arrangements  the  most appropriate  vehicle  for  implicit  subsidies  (for  example,16
of big  users  of electricity)  and--by  the force  of law--impose  their  will on
enterprises. The same  can  be said  about  waiving  taxes  and  deferring  exchange-
rate differences.
One  can  atgue,  in  the first  two  examples,  that  the  coalition  presented
here as  opposing  the  transfer  may in  fact (when  its  longer-term  interests  are
taken  into  account)  favor  them,  since  they  represent  an insurance  scheme. In
a system  where labor  is  meant  to absorb  all  risk,  as in Yugoslavia,  the  need
to  ensure  against  variations  in  personal  earnings  is of paramount  importance-
-so  this  objection  has some  validity. But  the  point  is that  such  insurance  is
inefficient  as it creates  a  moral  hazard: without  institutional  constraints,
workers  would  probably  not  want to bear  the  whole  risk  and  would  rather  shift
it onto  the  shoulders  of the  owners  of capital,  who can  ensure  themselves  by
holding  a diversified  portfolio. One indicator  that  such  an arrangement  is
not optimal  is the  "premium"  payment  schedule: the  least  endangered
enterprises  pay the  highest  "premium,"  and  the  ones  in the  worst  shape  pay
nothing  at all (obviously,  such  a scheme  must be  mandatory).
It is important  to  note in the  first  example  that  ultimately  the  bank
itself  will  probably  not  bear the  costs  of concessionary  financing--at  least
not  the  full  costs. With the  same  excuse  of being  financially  squeezed,  the
commercial  bank  will in turn  knock  on the  door  of the  central  bank  and  ask  for
help (again  in the  form  of subsidized  credit). The  bargaining  between
coalitions  is then  repeated  on a higher  level--again  with a predictable
outcome. One coalition  is representatives  of the  central  bank and  possibly  of
the  ministry  of finance. The  other  is  representatives  of the  commercial  bank
(a  potential  beneficiary)  who lack  the  power  on their  own  to enforce
redistribution--so  they  are  joined  by republican  and,  in  more important  cases,17
federal  ministries  from  the sectors  that  are  to  benefit  from  such  loans,  and,
if  necessary,  by top  federal  government  and  party  officials." 8
The chief  characteristic  of the  above-mentioned  methods  of resolving
distribution  problems  is the  personal  nature  of decisionmaking  (contrasted
with the  impersonal  nature  of  market  intermediation).  The  logic  of collective
action  implies  that  various  social  groups  difter  greatly  in their  power  to
organize  for  collective  action--with  grave  consequences  for  efficiency  (Olson
1965). The foregoing  cases  illustrate  this  point.
The  constituency  opposing  concessionary  crediting  is  the  population  as a
whole,  which  eventually  pays  for it  through  an inflation  tax. No wonder  a
coalition  with such  a broad  base  has  problems  representing  its  interests.
Similarly,  workers  at the  donor  BOAL  are  unable  to organize  and  block  the
inter-BOAL  transfer. Their  formal  leaders,  the  firm's  managers,  are  reluctant
to resist  the  transfer,  because  they  are  under  direct  pressure  from  advocates
of the  subsidy. And for  an individual  worker,  the  consequences  of
intervention  (getting  a reputation  for  stirring  up trouble  among  workers,
which  makes  it difficult  to get  a  new  job)  by far  exceed  the  expected
benefits. Similarly,  the  constituency  opposing  legally  imposed  financial
investments  is  workers  in the  firms  that  are  forced  to invest--and  the
constituency  opposing  legally-authorized  tax  waivers  is  the  tax  payer  who must
pay  higher  taxes  as a result  of the  waiver. Because  of their  large  number  and
18/  Bartlett (1989) describes in  detail the  struggle between opposing
coalitions  in  the  frustrated  attempt  to  enforce  restrictive  monetary  policy
in  Hungary  in 1987-88. He notes  that  ".  . . the  National  Bank's  defeat
in  this  case  reflects  not  merely  the  specific  circumstances  which  obtained
in  early  1988. In  the  Hungarian  context,  the  political  position  of  actors
seeking  to pursue  policies  of financial  discipline  is inherently  weaker
than  that  of actors  aiming  to expand  the  stock  of  money and  credit"  (p.
33).  This study  documents  that  claim  for  Yugoslavia,  but it applies  to
all  socialist  economies.18
the  unavailability  of selective  incentives  (Olson  1965),  these  workers  are
unable  to organize  themselves  to defend  their  interests. Their  chances  to
organize  themselves  are further  reduced  because  management,  rather  than
defending  their  interests,  is likely  to remain  loyal  and  conform  to the
center. The same  is  true  for (official)  labor  unions.
4.  CONCLUSIONS  AND  POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
The  mechanism  that  enables  Yugoslav  firms  to avoid  layoffs  is a system
of  bargaining  among  coalitions  that  results  in a  massive  redistribution  of
income  aimed  at--in  Kornai's  words (1980,  p. 315)--".  . . 'stabilization'  of
every  firm,  and  even  of every  job." A similar  conclusion  is likely  to apply
to other  RSEs.
What does  this  tell  us about  the  efficiency  of such  economies? Some
economists  defend  such  economies  as  being  "distributive  efficient."" But  an
economy  in  which  a substantial  part  of  GNP is  redistributed  through  bargaining
among  coalitions  is  bound  to  be inefficient  in  distribution,  because
coalitions  differ  in their  power  to  organize  for  collective  actions  (Olson
1982).  Socialist  economies  cannot,  therefore,  be praised  even for  equity.
RSEs fare  even  worse,  or course,  at production  efficiency. Compensatory
redistribution  offers  security  and  insurance  for  economic  agents,  but  creates
a  moral  hazard  which  bears  directly  on the  inadequate  work  motivation  (X-
inefficiency), 
2 0 the  irrational  investment  (allocative  inefficiency),  and  the
19/  Kornai  (1986),  for  instance,  claims  that  "(t)he  elimination  of  unemployment
is  an achievement  of great  historical  importance"  (p.  131).
20/  Using  a static  framework,  my estimate  of the deadweight  losses  produced
by compensatory  redistribution  in  Yugoslavia  in 1986  is  6 to 7  percent  of
GNP (Vodopivec  1990).19
suppression  of entrepreneurship  (dynamic  inefficiency)  found  in RSEs. 21
Moreover,  subsidies  create  a  wedge  between  the  wage paid  to a  worker  and  his
or her  value  marginal  product. When  wages  do not  reflect  the  opportunity
costs  of labor,  they  do  not send  the  right  signals  for  labor  allocation
economywide. The  macroeconomic  instability  of SEs  also  has its  roots  in
compensatory  redistribution,  because  these  economies  lean  heavily  toward
expansionary  monetary  policy  (see  Rocha  1990  for  evidence  of the  impact  of
public  sector  losses  on inflation  in  Yugoslavia).
The implications  of this  analysis  are  important  for  economic  policy,
particularly  in the  current  transition  of the  socialist  economies  of  Eastern
Europe. Overemployment  in the  RSEs  has  not  been  a goal in itself. Rather,
employment  subsidies  are  the  logical  result  in  a constrained  institutional
system  that  allows  powerful  distributional  coalitions  to emerge. Imposing  and
sustaining  financial iscipline  (attaining  a "hard  budget  constraint")
requires  more than  the  government's  willingness  (within  an unchanged
institutional  system)  to do so.  Among  other  things,  it  calls  for (a)  a
transparent  structure  of property  rights;  (b)  an unselective,  transparent
fiscal  system,  and (c)  a  multiparty  political  system  (to  provide  checks  and
balances  on the  ruling  party  and  thus  limit  its  ability  to redistribute).
21/  A similar  position,  pointing  to  the  discretionary  behavior  of  bureaucracy
as an important  cause  of inefficiencies  in the  Soviet  Union,  is taken  by
Litwak  (1990).20
APPENDIX:  METHOD  AND  DATA  USED  TO CALCULATE  REDISTRIBUTION  FLOWS
The analysis  in this paper  was based on 1986 data for a sample  of 416
Slovenian  manufacturing  enterprises.  Only  units  directly  engaged  in  production
activities  were selected. (So-called  working  communities  that  perform  general
services  such  as  marketing,  planning,  and  analyses,  were  dropped). Most  of the
units  in  the  sample  were  BOALs,  but  some  were  also  so-called  uniform  WOALs  (units
that  do  not consist  of BOALs). The  enterprises  in  the sample  account  for
about  10  percent  of total  GNP  of the  republic  of Slovenia,  the  most developed
of  Yugoslavia's  republics  and  autonomous  provinces.
Data  analyzed--Social  Accounting  Service  data--included  149  variables  from
the income  statement,  362  variables  from the  balance  sheet,  and 110  variables
from  the  special  accounting  data  set,  from  each firm.
To allow  for industry-level  analysis,  only industries  (as  defined  at the
lowest,  5-digit  level)  with 10 or more firms  were selected:  drawn  and rolled
steel,  cast  metal  products,  brick  production,  building  materials,  sawmilling,
board  manufacturing,  furniture,  paper  and  paper  products,  cotton  fabrics,
wool  fabrics, knitwear, underwear,  garments, footwear, bread and pastry,
vegetable  and  fruit  processing,  slaughteiring,  wine production,  and  printing.
How  variables  were calculated
Formal  taxes
Formal  taxes  were calculated  as the sum of the following  items  from the
income  statement:
- Obligations  to BOALs  providing  services  in education,  science  and culture,
health,  social  security,  other  social  services  determined  by law,  pension
and  disability  insurance.
- Obligations  for  housing  solidarity.
- Obligations  for  employment  and  social  security  of  workers.
- Republican income tax.
- Expenses  for  maintaining  and improving  the  environment.
- Memberships.
- Expenses  for  national  defense  and  social  self-protection.
- Contributions  for  Economic  Chambers  and  other  professional  organizations.
- Other obligations from income.
- Part  of the income  for  other  specific  purposes.
- Monopoly  part  of income  transferred  to other  enterprises.
- Part  of the  net  operating  income  used  to cover  the  losses  of other  BOALs.
- Part  of net  operating  income  for  other  purposes.
- Part  of net  operating  income  for  other  funds.
Formal  subsidies
Formal  subsidies  are calculated  as the sum of the following  items (all
memorandum  items  on the  income  statement,  except  "coverage  of the loss
from  previous  years,"  which  is taken  from  the "special  accounting  data  set"):21
- Coverage  of losses  from  the  fund  for  joint  reserves  of sister  BOALs.
- Coverage  of losses  from  common  risk-bearing  wi:hin  a  WOAL.
- Coverage  of losses  from  other  sources  of a  nonreimbursable  nature.
- Coverage  of losses  from  resource  pooling.
- Coverage  of losses  from  previous  years (received  in the  current  year)  by
nonreimbursable  resources,  and  debt  write-offs  incurred  to cover  losses  from
previous  years.
Quasitaxes
A quasitax  base is calculated  as the  sum  of the following  items  from  the
asset  side  of the  balance  sheet:
Claims  within  a  WOAL
- Coverage  of the  losses  of other  BOALs.
- Rehabilitation  credits.
- Shott-term  and long-term  resource  pooling.
Short-term  lending
- Purchase  of securities.
- Resource  pooling  with other  firms.
- Resource  pooling  in  the  internal  bank.
Long-term  lending
- Pooling  with other  firms.
- Pooling  in the  SMCIs  of  material  production.
- Resource  pooling  in  the  internal  bank.
- Resource  pooling  in banks.
- Resource  pooling  with firms  from  the  less-developed  regions.
- Resource  pooling  with other  social  agents.
- Pooling  in the  development  fund  of the  sociopolitical  community.
- Long-term  rehabilitation  credits.
- Lending  to the  Federal  Fund  for  Acceleration  of the  Development  of Less
Developed  Regions.
- Lending  according  to the  regulations  of sociopolitical  communities.
- Purchase  of securities  and  other  long-term  lending.
Financial  investment  in reserve  and  solidarity  funds
- Claims  for  resources  pooled  in  the fund  for  joint  reserves  of the  WOAL.
- Claims  for  resources  pooled  in the  fund  for  joint  reserves  of
Sociopolitical  Communities.
- Claims  for  rehabilitation  credits  from  the  reserve  fund.
- Purchase  of securities  and  other  lending  from  the  reserve  fund.
- Claims  for  pooling  of resources  from  the  solidarity  fund.22
Quasisubsidies
A quasisubsidy  base  is  calculated  as the  sum  of the  following  liabilities:
- Liabilities  for  the  part  of the  business  fund  to cover  losses.
- Liabilities  from  long-term  pooling  (with  other  BOALs,  in  the  SMCIs  of  material
production,  with  banks,  other  social  agents,  farmers,  and  private  persons).
Short-term  liabilities
- For  long-term  rehabilitation  credits.
- For  short-term  rehabilitation  credits.
- For  underpaid  income  taxes.
- For  underpaid  contributions  based  on income.
- For  other  underpaid  obligations  based  on income.
- For taxes  on  personal  incomes.
- For contributions  based  on personal  income.
- For resources  lent  to  cover  losses  during  the  year  within  a  WOAL.
- For rehabilitation  credits  within  a  W0AL.
Liabilities  from  the  reserve  fund
- To other  firms.
- Other  liabilities.
Liabilities  from  the  solidarity  fund  and the  fund  for  other  purposes
- Liabilities  for  the  resources  of the  solidarity  funds  lent  by other  firms.
- Other  liabilities  from  the  solidarity  fund.
- Liabilities  for  the  resources  for  other  purposes  lent  by other  firms.
- Other  liabilities  for  the  resources  for  other  purposes.
Losses  on money
The sum  of the  following  assets  is the  base used to calculate  losses  on
money:
- Money  assets.
- Securities  (checks,  promissory  notes,  bonds,  other).
- Claims  on the  basis  of  business  relations.
- Claims  on the  basis  of income.
- Claims  within  a  WOAL.
- Paid  obligations  from  income.
- (Short-term  and  long-term)  lending.
- Money  assets  held  for  investment  purposes.
- Claims  for  advances  of investments.
- Reserve  fund  assets.
- Assets  of the solidarity  fund  and  assets  for  other  purposes.23
Collective  consumption  assets
- Money assets.
- Financial  assets  pooled  in the  SNCI  for  housing.
- Pooled  resources  for  housing  within  a  WOAL.
- Other  lending  from  reJources  earmarked  for  housing.
- Claims  from  resources  earmarked  for  housing.
Assets  earmarked  for  other  needs  of collective  consumption
- Money assets.
- Pooled  resources  for  other  needs  within  a  WOAL.
- Pooled  resources  for  other  needs.
- Other  lending  from  resources  earmarked  for  other  needs.
- Money  assets  held on giro  account.
- Claims  from  resources  earmarked  for  other  needs.
The  reduction  of  losses  on  money  mentioned  in  the  text  (returns  on  the  above
financial  investments)  is calculated  as the  sum  of interest  revenues,  revenues
from  participating  in  joint  bank  income,  and  revenues  from  participating  in  the
joint  income  of  other  enterprises,  minus  expenses  for  covering  the  loss  of  other
enterprises  as  stipulated  in the  agreement  on resource  pooling.
Gains  on  money
The sum  of the  following  liabilities  is  used as the  base for  calculating
gains  on  money:
- Long-term  credits.
- Short-term credits.
- Liabilities  for  short-term  pooled  resources.
- Liabilities  from  business  relations,  except  liabilities  to  workers.
- Liabilities  on  income,  except  for  distributed  net  income  for  personal  incomes.
- Liabilities  for  taxes  and contributions.
- Liabilities within a WOAL.
- Liabilities  for  pooled  solidarity  resources.
- Liabilities  for  other  solidarity  resources.
- Liabilities  for  pooled  resources  for  housing.
- Liabilities  for  loans  earmarked  for  housing.
- Other  liabilities  for  resources  earmarked  for  housing.
- Liabilities  for  pooled  resources  for  other  needs  of collective  consumption.
- Liabilities  from  loans  for  resources  for  other  needs  of  collective  consumption.
- Other  liabilities  for  resources  earmarked  for  other  needs  of collective
consumption.
- Other  sources  of resources  earmarked  for  other  needs  of collective
consumption.
The reduction  of  gains  on  money (interest  payments  on the  above  financial
investments)  is calculated  as the sum  of interest  payments  for credits  for
working  capital,  interest  payments  for  credits  for  fixed  assets,  payments of
dividends  to  other  enterprises,  and  payments  of dividends  to foreign  persons.24
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